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Abstract
International cooperation is essential to support states in building the human resources necessary for
maintaining and strengthening nuclear security. As the nation’s only comprehensive nuclear research and
development institute, the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) has long-standing experience
developing and operating nuclear technology in all steps of the fuel cycle. The Integrated Support Center
for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security (ISCN) was established within the JAEA in December
2010 as Japan’s Center of Excellence for nuclear security. The ISCN provides assistance with capacity
building to states throughout Asia and some other regions. The objective of this article is to describe the
contribution of the ISCN to human resources development in the field of nuclear security, using its
contributions to regional physical protection training and computer security training as illustrative
examples. This article also considers the lessons learned from the ISCN’s experience that may benefit
other nuclear security training and support centers.

I.

Introduction

The ISCN was established in December 2010 to provide international assistance with human resources
and technology development, in response to the commitments of Japan at the 2010 Nuclear Security
Summit in Washington DC. The ISCN is involved extensively in capacity building assistance in the fields
of nuclear security and safeguards, mainly in Asia. The ISCN supports the commitments contained in the
2010 Nuclear Security Summit Work Plan, including that: “Participating States will encourage the
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creation of and networking among nuclear security support centers for capacity building to disseminate
and share best practices and will support IAEA activities in this area.”
This article describes the good practices of the ISCN, focusing on one of its core nuclear security courses,
the Regional Training Course on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (RTC on
PP). The next section provides an overview of the ISCN’s main capacity building support activities,
illustrating the diversity of the Center’s training offerings. The third section describes the development of
the ISCN’s RTC on PP. The ISCN also conducts or contributes to training courses spanning a variety of
established and emerging topics in the field of nuclear security. The fourth section of this paper describes
the ISCN’s capacity building activities for one of these topics, computer security. The fifth section seeks
to draw out lessons from the ISCN’s six years of experience for the benefit of newer nuclear security
training and support centers (NSSCs).

II.

Scope of Capacity-Building Support Activities

To accomplish its mission of promoting nuclear security, a center of excellence (COE) must contribute to
training professionals and facilitate exchanges of information and experience. In pursuit of this goal, the
ISCN conducts three types of training courses: Nuclear Security Courses, Safeguards and State System of
Accounting and Control (SSAC) Courses, and International Nonproliferation Framework Courses. As of
March 2016, the ISCN has conducted 100 training courses and trained a total of 2748 participants from 73
countries (including Japan) and three international organizations. Over 60% of these participants came
from outside Japan. This article focuses on the ISCN’s provision of nuclear security courses – as of
March 2016, the ISCN’s 65 Nuclear Security Courses alone have received 1676 participants.
The greatest need for capacity building support exists among states developing new nuclear energy
programs or expanding existing programs. Most of these states are located in Asia. In order to analyze the
training needs of potential recipients, the JAEA began conducting dedicated needs survey missions with
ASEAN member states in 2010 (before the ISCN’s establishment). The ISCN later expanded these
missions to include Bangladesh, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Mongolia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey,
Ukraine, and the United Arab Emirates.
The ISCN determined that there was a need among many states for detailed technical training on physical
protection, the first line of defense against malevolent acts. There was also a need for training on
relatively new topic areas, such as nuclear forensics and nuclear security culture. Many of these topics
could be handled in international or regional courses, allowing the ISCN to assist as many states as
possible with limited resources. However, some state-specific issues would best be handled through
bilateral dispatching courses tailored to the recipient state’s existing or planned nuclear activities. The
ISCN has also developed training opportunities to meet the demand among domestic organizations
responsible for specific aspects of nuclear security.

A.

International/Regional Training Courses

The scope of the concept of nuclear security has expanded in recent years to accommodate new legal
instruments and guidelines (including the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of
Nuclear Material (CPPNM)), the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear
Terrorism, United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1373 and 1540, and the 2003 revision to the
Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. New technologies have also
introduced new opportunities to prevent, detect and respond to unauthorized or malicious acts. These
changes have impacted the work of a variety of individuals charged with maintaining the security of
nuclear facilities and nuclear materials (and other radioactive materials), thereby introducing new
requirements for practical, hands-on training.
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The ISCN has designed its regional training courses to meet these training needs. Section III explains the
development of the ISCN’s annual RTC on PP in detail. Since establishing this course, the ISCN has
progressively expanded its training offerings in line with its growing expertise to meet the human
resource development needs of governments, competent authorities, and operators in a number of
relatively new topic areas. The ISCN held its first workshops on the IAEA’s Nuclear Security
Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities
(INFCIRC/225/Rev.5) in 2011 in cooperation with Japan’s Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports,
Science, and Technology (MEXT), U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration
(DOE/NNSA), and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). These workshops took place just a few months
after the IAEA issued the revision. The IAEA recognized the good practice of the ISCN and SNL in
providing training to states on the practical implementation of the IAEA guidelines and requested that the
ISCN and SNL transfer their workshop curriculum. The IAEA, the ISCN, and SNL then worked together
to establish an expanded five-day IAEA Regional Training Course on INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 in 2013.
The ISCN now also conducts or contributes to courses on nuclear forensics, nuclear security culture,
measures against sabotage, insider threats, radioactive sources security, and transport security. The
ISCN’s contributions to computer security training are described in detail in Section IV.

B.

Bilateral Dispatching Courses

The ISCN has also tailored training cooperation to appropriately match the identified needs of individual
states that request the ISCN’s assistance. As of May 2016, the ISCN has conducted a total of nine nuclear
security dispatching courses in five states. For example, in 2013, the ISCN co-organized a workshop on
border security monitoring with the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre and DOE/NNSA for
Lithuania’s new COE in its Border Guard School. In 2015, the ISCN and SNL hosted a more advanced,
five-day National Workshop on Evaluation of Nuclear Security Plan to enhance the Turkish Atomic
Energy Authority’s capability to review the nuclear security plans that will be submitted by the operator
of reactors scheduled to begin construction later this year.
As the first COE in Asia, the ISCN has taken on a role as a model for other states that are setting up
NSSCs. The ISCN has expanded bilateral cooperation to share best practices in the steps involved in
establishing a training center. In June 2016, the ISCN hosted a preliminary meeting for human resources
development with DOE/NNSA and Kazakhstan on the latter’s nascent nuclear security training center.
The ISCN shared its experience of establishing a COE and training courses with Kazakhstan.
Indonesia’s Nuclear Energy Regulatory Agency (BAPETEN) and National Nuclear Energy Agency
(BATAN) are each establishing security centers. Both agencies are sending visiting researchers to ISCN
to learn how to develop and teach nuclear security courses. In September 2016, the ISCN, BAPETEN,
and BATAN are hosting a five-day “follow-up” training course on physical protection in Indonesia with
former visiting researchers serving as lecturers. Through this course, the ISCN will assist Indonesia’s
security centers to become providers of domestic training courses. Malaysia has also asked the ISCN to
provide similar support to build capabilities to train its domestic audience.

C.

Domestic Courses

As explained in Section III, the ISCN began providing training on physical protection for Japan’s
operators and regulators in 2012. The ISCN has also provided physical protection and emergency
response training courses for security authorities that have requested its assistance, including the
Chemical School of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force, the Japan Coast Guard, and the National
Police Agency.
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The ISCN has partnered with the World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) to provide an annual
workshop promoting nuclear security culture to domestic audiences (operators, regulators, and other
relevant government officials). The ISCN has also partnered with DOE/NNSA to develop courses on
physical protection detection system performance testing (2013) and scenario development (2014).
In addition to these courses, the ISCN reaches the broadest possible audiences of facility personnel,
research institutes, competent authorities, and other relevant government officials by conducting lecture
series in Japan and seminars overseas aimed at raising (or refreshing) awareness of nuclear security
threats and individuals’ responsibilities. In 2013, the ISCN received a request from a domestic operator
for support with the operator’s nuclear security awareness raising and culture fostering activities. In
response to the request, the ISCN introduced a Nuclear Security Culture lecture series covering the
history of the international nuclear security framework, real cases of security breaches at nuclear facilities
around the world, and the roles and responsibilities of staff members [1]. The lectures have expanded
since 2013 as more utility companies have invited the ISCN to speak to their workers. In 2015, the ISCN
conducted lectures at thirteen nuclear power plants across Japan for a total audience of 2300 workers. The
ISCN also reaches out to policy makers, energy ministry officials, and nuclear security regulatory
authorities in Southeast Asia through an annual joint seminar on nuclear security with the ASEAN Center
for Energy, which discusses the implementation of international legal instruments, development of human
resources, and promotion of nuclear security culture.

III. The ISCN’s Regional Training Course on Physical
Protection (RTC on PP)
The ISCN developed its RTC on PP in 2011 to help satisfy the human resource development needs of
countries in Asia with respect to this core topic of nuclear security. Focusing on physical protection
allowed the ISCN to make optimal use of the JAEA’s existing experience.
To help build the ISCN’s capacity, the ISCN partnered with DOE/NNSA and SNL to host a train-thetrainer (pilot) course on physical protection in August 2011. The pilot course relied on lectures and
materials from SNL’s subject matter experts, many of whom had considerable experience as instructors
for SNL’s long-standing three-week International Training Course on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material and Nuclear Facilities. Participants for the pilot course included engineers, researchers, and
managers from the JAEA with experience in fuel cycle-related projects.
The ISCN then co-hosted the first of its annual two-week RTCs on PP in October 2011 in cooperation
with DOE/NNSA and SNL. The RTC on PP included lectures by JAEA staff with SNL experts on hand
to assist. This arrangement allowed relatively new ISCN instructors to gain experience with delivering the
course while guaranteeing the highest possible standard of training for participants.
The ISCN has progressively increased its contribution to the RTC on PP over time. The ISCN has built up
its base of expert instructors to the point where it now provides the majority of instructors and undertakes
the majority of curriculum development for the course. However, the course still receives a couple
instructors from SNL each year to work alongside the ISCN’s instructors. To ensure a consistent standard
among trainers, the ISCN and SNL continue to cooperate on the training of the ISCN’s instructors, with
new instructors attending SNL’s International Training Course.

A.

Realistic Training Environments

The ISCN introduced major innovations into the curriculum of the RTC on PP in 2012, utilizing the
JAEA’s new Physical Protection Exercise Field and Virtual Reality System. The Physical Protection
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Exercise Field allows participants to gain hands-on experience with real physical protection equipment in
a realistic environment. The Virtual Reality System allows participants to train using the detailed layout
of a realistic facility. Together, these practical tools provide comprehensive environments for conducting
a range of training exercises.
The Physical Protection Exercise Field incorporates a variety of types of fences, sensors, cameras,
lighting systems, and contraband detection equipment. The interior of the main building of the Exercise
Field includes a Central Alarm Station, which collects and displays signals and data from the Field’s
physical protection system equipment. Participants learn the functions of each device and have the
opportunity to act as Central Alarm Station officers, security guards, police officers, or intruders. The
Field provides participants with experience in design of physical protection systems, including entry
control, intrusion detection, access delay, and response to simulated alarms. The Field is also designed to
facilitate realistic equipment performance assessment and analysis of intrusion pathways.
Since 2012, the ISCN has also used the Physical Protection Exercise Field to support part of the inspector
training courses of the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) of Japan through practical, realistic exercises
and interactive equipment demonstrations. The fact that this highly specialized institution regularly looks
to the ISCN to use its capacity building expertise to enrich its training programs demonstrates the good
practices of the ISCN in the provision of hands-on and technical training.
The Virtual Reality System is a three-dimensional simulation of a hypothetical nuclear facility and
surrounding environment. Virtual reality allows access to all parts of the facility, including locations that
would be inaccessible during a tour of a real facility due to information security or radiation protection
constraints. The Virtual Reality System also allows participants to view detection zones (sensing areas
and blind spots) for different sensor configurations. Compared with a real site, the virtual site is easy to
modify to test the strengths and weaknesses of various physical protection systems. The ambient
environment (geography, lighting, weather, etc.) can also be varied in order to illustrate the impact of a
variety of conditions on physical protection systems. The Virtual Reality System also supports simulation
of different types of security incidents and intrusions that would be impractical or unsafe to recreate at a
real site.

B.

Unique Learning Opportunities

The ISCN’s initial course offerings came just months after the Great East Japan earthquake and tsunami
in March 2011. Several of the ISCN’s training offerings have included lectures on the lessons learned
from the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant to underscore the importance of
preventing, detecting and responding to incidents at nuclear facilities, including sabotage. The events at
Fukushima Daiichi highlight the importance of extending protection to auxiliary systems, in addition to
reactors themselves [2]. The lectures also illustrate that, even in the aftermath of a severe nuclear
accident, the nuclear material must always be secured against theft.
ISCN training courses include visits to Hiroshima or Nagasaki, incorporating the good practice of placing
the gravity of the threat of nuclear proliferation in context for participants. The horror of the atomic
bombings serves as a stark reminder of the importance of controlling the use of nuclear materials. In this
way, training builds not only the participants’ knowledge and skills but also their attitudes toward
nonproliferation and their motivation to continue to work in the field of nuclear security.

C.

Expansion to Domestic Training

Although the ISCN’s training on physical protection was initially established with an international
audience in mind, in 2012 the ISCN began offering a domestic training course on physical protection of
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nuclear materials and facilities for utility companies and government officials. The ISCN translated the
course materials developed with SNL for the RTC on PP into Japanese for the benefit of these domestic
training recipients. The ISCN also modified the materials to fit the specific requirements of national
physical protection regulations. Many of the participants in this course are established experts in specific
aspects of nuclear security or related technologies. This training course gives these experts the
opportunity to expand their expertise and understand how their work fits into the broader national nuclear
security regime.

IV. Computer Security Training at the ISCN
Computer security is an emerging training area experiencing high demand. Worldwide, there is a shortage
of practitioners who have experience in both computer security and nuclear security. Planning a computer
security training course involves the additional challenge of reaching out to officials who do not
necessarily have a background in physical protection.

A.

Meeting Domestic Training Needs

In contrast with the RTC on PP, the ISCN’s computer security courses have their origins in domestic
training needs. Japan revised security regulations in 2011 and 2012 and developed implementation
guidance for operators on protecting computer systems at nuclear facilities based in part on a draft of the
IAEA’s Nuclear Security Series No. 17 Technical Guidance on Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities
[3]. Consequently, the NRA began including computer security in physical protection inspections. To
assist the implementation of these new measures, the NRA asked the ISCN to provide an introductory
computer security course for both operators and government officials in Japan.
The ISCN partnered with the IAEA to host a course in Tokyo in May 2014. The IAEA had experience
offering five-day awareness training courses based on its technical guidance on computer security. The
ISCN shortened the course to one day for government officials and two days for operators since most of
these prospective participants are too busy to attend a longer course. Thirty-two officials from
government ministries, the National Police Agency, and the Japan Coast Guard attended the one-day
training aimed at establishing awareness of threats and consequences, as well as Japan’s regulatory
framework [4]. This part of the course emphasized the unique challenges of computer security for nuclear
facilities and industrial control systems, as compared with office IT security.
The two-day training for operators introduced methods for conducting risk assessments and developing
computer security policies. The course received 35 participants, including personnel with responsibility
for facility operation and safety-related computer systems. In hosting this course, the ISCN, therefore,
gained experience training a broader range of domestic participants, including officers who are not
usually part of physical security. The course’s exercise on risk assessment highlighted the importance of
developing channels of communication between these practitioners and traditional physical protection
personnel at nuclear facilities.

B.

Expansion to International Training

The ISCN co-hosted the IAEA Regional Workshop on the Development of National Training Programs
in Computer Security in Tokai, Japan from June 27 to July 1, 2016. This was the first ever train-thetrainer course on computer security by the IAEA. The course received seventeen participants from
regulators, NSSCs, and other research institutes in Asia. The course aimed to enable participants to use
the IAEA’s computer security guidance documents and training materials to fulfill training needs in their
home countries. Participants commented that the course also encouraged them to participate in the review
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or development of national computer security regulation and computer security policies at their own
organizations.
The course incorporated country presentations by the participants. This provided an opportunity for the
IAEA, the ISCN, and other nuclear security stakeholders to discuss the capacity building needs of states
in the region with respect to this relatively new nuclear security topic. The IAEA is also using its
experience of partnering with the ISCN to develop online e-learning training materials based on the
courses held in Japan and feedback received from participants [4].

V.

Lessons for Development of Nuclear Security Training
and Support Centers

The ISCN’s six years of experience have yielded a number of lessons for other states establishing NSSCs.
Firstly, the decision to site an NSSC within either an operator or a regulator should be based on the degree
of experience of each body and the aims of the NSSC. The ISCN’s contribution to nuclear security has
been enriched by being located within the JAEA, an institution with a long-standing role in research and
development and an operator of many facilities. Operators have central responsibilities for security at
their facilities, and for the development of personnel, so being attuned to their training needs is
enormously beneficial. Furthermore, the JAEA’s analytical laboratories have developed experience in
fields like nuclear forensics, which contributes to the ISCN’s course offerings.
As an independent administrative institution, the JAEA does not have the authority of a government
organization. Domestic utility companies and competent authorities often request assistance from the
ISCN, and the ISCN provides a forum for the free exchange of information among these bodies.
However, the ISCN cannot make its training courses mandatory. For other states, siting an NSSC within a
regulatory authority may be advantageous, particularly if the NSSC is intended to reach out to all
domestic utility companies as a matter of priority.
Secondly, an NSSC must have effective working relationships with the IAEA and other NSSCs. These
relationships are invaluable in building up a base of instructors. Cross-institutional train-the-trainer
programs provide new instructors with a pathway to gain essential experience. Many of the individuals
who were trained through ISCN courses have themselves gone on to provide training, either at the ISCN
or elsewhere.
As more NSSCs begin offering training opportunities, harmonization of these activities is becoming
increasingly important. The ISCN works particularly closely with SNL and the IAEA to develop its
course materials and its instructors. The IAEA’s International Network for Nuclear Security Training &
Support Centers (NSSC Network) is a useful development in this respect. The NSSC Network is currently
comprised of 63 institutions designated by 54 member states [5]. The ISCN discusses the coordination of
the scheduling of training activities and the harmonization of the contents of training courses with other
institutions in the Network. By taking care to avoid scheduling clashes with courses at other centers, it
will be possible to maximize opportunities for other states to send participants for training without being
short-staffed at home. The ISCN is also preparing to share resources (instructors/personnel, curricula, and
training materials) with other NSSCs so they may be used at maximum capacity.
The ISCN participates in information exchanges about training activities with the other nuclear security
COEs in the region, the International Nuclear Nonproliferation and Security Academy (INSA) of the
Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control and the State Nuclear Security Technology
Center (SNSTC) of the China Atomic Energy Authority. The COEs share good practices by dispatching
instructors and observers to each other’s courses [6]. The ISCN and INSA have also conducted regular
telephone conferences since 2013 with a view to coordinating their training activities [7].

7

International Journal of Nuclear Security, Vol. 2 [2016], No. 1, Art. 13
International Journal of Nuclear Security, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2016

Finally, curriculum design and course organization should follow a needs-oriented approach based on
participants’ roles and responsibilities in nuclear security and their background knowledge. It is helpful to
offer multiple types of courses based on the needs of participants. Some courses are necessarily brief and
directed toward raising awareness, particularly for senior government officials with busy schedules.
Others courses should cover measures in full technical detail, build practical skills, and provide hands-on
experience, particularly for officials working at nuclear facilities.

VI. Conclusion
The ISCN was one of the first COEs to come out of the Nuclear Security Summit process. Many other
states have since established or are establishing nuclear security training and support centers. The ISCN
demonstrates how a center can build up a repository of knowledge in cooperation with others in order to
meet the training needs of domestic and international regulatory authorities, security authorities, research
institutes, and operators. Its training programs also demonstrate the value of sharing experience among
stakeholders in nuclear security without revealing sensitive information. The ISCN’s role as a provider of
capacity building assistance and as a model for other training centers continues after the final Nuclear
Security Summit in 2016.
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